Monday, September 20, 2010

Will the Truth Ever Be Told II Israeli Submarine Dakar

It seems that the U.S. Air Force and Navy started to change their relations with Israel in early June 1967. Author Stephen Green in a 1984 book, "Taking Sides: America's Secret Relations With A Militant Israel", said that the USS Liberty was attacked because the ship had discovered a secret U.S. Air Force operation during the Six Day War, located in the Negev Desert. This was the location of a secret Israeli nuclear weapons facility at Dimona. Is there a possible link between this early co-operation and links to
the recent breakdown of proper handling of nuclear weapons at Air Force bases in Minot, North Dakota; Barksdale, Louisiana; F. E. Warren located in Wyoming?

In November 1991 Rowland Evans and Robert Novak reported that the Israeli's knew the Liberty was an American ship when they attacked it. Former U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon confirmed the Evans-Novak report. On July 18, 1967 Clifford Clark the chairman of the Presidents Foreign Intelligence Board said "the unprovoked attack constituted a flagrant act of gross negligence for which the Israel Government should be held accountable and the Israeli military personnel involved should
be punished."

But was there payback? In November 1967 Israel announced that their fourth submarine INS Dakar
had been commissioned. The Dakar had been purchased in 1964 in used condition from the British Navy.

January 26, 1968 the British, not Israeli Naval Headquarters reported the submarine was missing some 100 miles from Cyprus. The Israeli government for the most part kept it a state secret, and would not admit the submarine was missing.

The British destroyer Diana and the USS Turner were deployed to the last known position of the Dakar, carrying decompression equipment in the search for any survivors.

Israel denied that the submarine was sunk by any "hostile action." But if it was possibly a retaliatory strike by the U.S. Navy (maybe aided by Britain) would not be considered hostile action, but revenge for the attack on the USS Liberty.

Reports from Cyprus that signal on the same frequency used by the Dakar's radio buoy might have been a distress call search planes and ships could not find the buoy. There were reports  of debris, oil slicks and floating drums, but these reports quickly stopped.

On February 4, 1968 Israel stopped the search for the Dakar. They claimed that Dakar had been conducting crash dive exercises and probably was lost due to mechanical failure. On April 25, 1968 the commander of the Israeli Navy stated that Dakar sank from human or technical failure, and said there was no evidence of "foul play".

On January 1, 1970 Egypt reported that Dakar had been sunk by depth charges from an Egyptian navy ship. Israel said that report was "utter nonsense" and there was nothing to indicate that was what happened. Israel then changed the date of the sinking to January 25, 1968, the third time the date was
changed.

In August of 1968 the New York Times said that the U.S. Navy was going to conduct a search in Egyptian waters, close to where the USS Liberty was attacked in 1967. P-3 Orion and carrier based
S-3 ASW aircraft were used to no avail. Israel used a salvage vessel 3 times looking for Dakar, and came up empty.

Then in 1997 Israel pulled a book called "Dakar" from the shelves, written by former Israeli Navy Captain Michael Eldar. His book revealed that the search for Dakar was never serious. One has to wonder if this is true, then why was a search only done halfheartedly?

Finally in May 1999, a U.S.-Israeli team found the Dakar in 9500 feet of water between Cyprus and Crete. The bow of the submarine was intact, the middle part showed extensive damage, the aft portion had been completely broken off. One report stated that it had been hit by an acoustic homing air-dropped torpedo.

What really happened to Dakar?

---------------- "And so the greatest of American triumphs... became a peculiarly joyless victory. We had won the Cold War, but there would be no parades." -- Robert M. Gates, 1996